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The fluency of stimulus processing significantly contributes to recognition memory 20 
judgments. We investigated the effect of processing fluency induced by attentional cueing on 21 
recognition judgments. Participants performed a Remember/Know recognition test, while 22 
their spatial attention was manipulated in the test session. Stimulus location was either 23 
predicted (congruent condition) or unpredicted (incongruent condition) using an arrow cue. 24 
The results revealed that familiarity-based false recognition increased in the incongruent 25 
condition wherein the participants may have attributed part of the perceived disfluency to the 26 
attentional cue, and they may have overestimated the fluency for the stimulus, leading to 27 
increased false recognition. However, in the congruent condition, the participants may have 28 
attributed some parts of the perceived fluency to the attentional cue and underestimated the 29 
fluency for the stimulus, leading to decreased false recognition. In sum, stimulus-irrelevant 30 
attentional cueing induces unintentional processing about the source of fluency and biases 31 
recognition memory. 32 
 33 
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1. Introduction 2 
Human memory has been extensively investigated using recall and recognition tests 3 
(see Yonelinas, 2002 for a review). While participants in recall tests retrieve internal memory 4 
representations, participants in recognition tests compare the perceptual input of the stimulus 5 
with their internal memory representations. Thus, recognition tests involve perceptual as well 6 
as memory processes. The perception of the stimulus in recognition memory tests can affect 7 
whether the stimulus is recognized as old or new. One excellent example of this is “memory 8 
illusion,” reported by Jacoby and Whitehouse (1989). They demonstrated that a stimulus 9 
preceded by a masked unconscious prime was more likely to be recognized as old, thus, 10 
suggesting that increased processing fluency generates increased feelings of familiarity for 11 
the stimulus, leading to increased “old” responses. 12 
 13 
Furthermore, Jacoby and Whitehouse (1989) reported that participants were more 14 
likely to recognize a stimulus as new when it was preceded by a visible prime. They 15 
explained this reversion of the priming effect using the idea that participants attribute some 16 
parts of perceived fluency to a visible prime and discount fluency for the stimulus. This 17 
reversion of the priming effect has been replicated in several studies, but the “fluency 18 
discounting” account has been challenged (Klinger, 2001; Higham & Vokey, 2000; Huber, 19 
Clark, Curran, & Winkielman, 2008). Huber et al. (2008) proposed that the reversal of the 20 
priming effect on recognition judgments is explicable without fluency discounting. Their 21 
“fluency/disfluency” account suggests that a short prime duration leads to priming and makes 22 
stimulus processing fluent, which results in increased “old” responses. In contrast, a longer 23 
prime duration leads to habituation and makes stimulus processing disfluent, which results in 24 
decreased “old” responses. In short, Jacoby and Whitehouse (1989) assumed that a conscious 25 
awareness of the prime induces fluency discounting, which is critical for the reversal of 26 
priming, whereas Huber et al. (2008) assumed that stimulus fluency itself is critical, 27 
regardless of awareness of the prime. One reason for this controversy may be that the visual 28 
awareness of the prime and fluency for the stimulus covary according to the manipulation of 29 
prime duration. Thus, alternative methods to manipulate fluency are likely to offer new 30 
insights into this topic. 31 
 32 
One potent method to manipulate fluency is attentional cueing (e.g., Posner, 1980; 33 
Shepherd, Findlay, & Hockey, 1986; Tipples, 2002). Bayliss, Paul, Cannon, and Tipper 34 
(2006) reported that the processing of the target stimulus becomes more fluent when the 35 
stimulus location is predicted by attentional cueing. Using attentional cueing, one can 36 
manipulate the fluency/disfluency of stimulus processing with keeping a visual awareness of 37 





arrow cue automatically affects participants’ attention (e.g., Ristic & Kingstone, 2006; 1 
Tipples, 2002). We set cue validity at 50% to equalize the number of predicted trials and 2 
unpredicted trials. 3 
 4 
It is important to take note of the results of a study by Rajaram and Geraci (2000). In 5 
this study, participants performed a Remember/Know recognition memory test (Tulving, 6 
1985; Gardiner, 1988) while stimulus fluency was manipulated by conceptual priming. The 7 
results demonstrated that priming selectively affected “know” responses but did not affect 8 
“remember” responses. These results provided strong support for the dual-process theory of 9 
recognition memory, which assumes that recollection and familiarity depend on different 10 
retrieval mechanisms (Atkinson & Juola, 1974; Hintzman & Curran, 1994; Jacoby & Dallas, 11 
1981; Mandler, 1980; Wixted, 2007).  12 
 13 
The selective effect of fluency manipulation on know responses is compatible with 14 
two influential models of recognition memory. Under the dual-process signal detection 15 
(DPSD) model (Yonelinas, 1994), recollection is considered an all-or-none threshold process, 16 
which cannot be affected by fluency manipulation. However, familiarity is considered a 17 
continuous variable characterized by a signal detection process that can be affected by 18 
fluency manipulation. Alternatively, under the continuous dual-process (CDP) model (Wixted 19 
& Mickes, 2010), both recollection and familiarity are considered continuous variables, 20 
additively combined into a single unidimensional memory strength distribution, on which 21 
old/new responses depend. Furthermore, the CDP model assumes that remember responses 22 
are based on a recollection distribution, and know responses are based on a familiarity 23 
distribution. The CDP model is compatible with the results in Rajaram and Geraci (2000), 24 
assuming that fluency manipulation affects familiarity distribution but leaves recollection 25 
distribution relatively unaffected. We return to this point in the General Discussion. 26 
 27 
In the present study, we investigated the effect of attentional cueing on recollection 28 
and familiarity using the Remember/Know procedure. If the stimulus-irrelevant attentional 29 
cue biases memory, this will be a matter of significant importance in the theoretical 30 
understanding of human memory and in our lives outside the laboratory. 31 
 32 
2. Preliminary Experiment 33 
We conducted a preliminary study to explore appropriate sample size and other task 34 
settings (e.g., set size of stimuli, and duration of attentional cue). We expected that attentional 35 
cueing would affect participants’ recognition bias but not recognition accuracy. Dissimilar to 36 







3. Methods 2 
3.1 Participants 3 
Twenty-two students from Kyoto University aged between 18 and 25 (M = 21.5, SD = 4 
1.97) participated in the preliminary experiment and were paid according to the Kyoto 5 
University standard. This sample size was determined by reference to related studies (14 in 6 
Dew and Cabeza, 2013; 20–24 in Lucas et al., 2012; 24 in Woollams et al., 2008; 22 in Taylor 7 
et al., 2013; 14–20 in Whittlesea and Williams, 2000; 13–21 in Whittlesea and Williams, 8 
2001). Eleven participants were male and 11 were female. All participants had normal color 9 
vision. Informed written consent was obtained from participants before the experiment. All 10 
data were collected in accordance with the ethical principles of the Japanese Psychological 11 
Association. Data from two participants were excluded because one participant exhibited 12 
recognition accuracy below chance and the other exhibited no false alarms at all. 13 
 14 
3.2 Stimuli 15 
The stimuli consisted of 320 color pictures of everyday objects; the pictures were 16 
obtained from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology website 17 
(http://cvcl.mit.edu/MM/index.html). These stimuli were randomly assigned to each 18 
experimental condition (congruent/new, congruent/old, incongruent/new, and 19 
incongruent/old) for each participant. The stimuli were displayed on a dark background on a 20 
23-inch computer monitor (I-O DATA, LCD-MF234XPBR) using the software Presentation 21 
(Neurobehavioral Systems). Each stimulus was framed in a white window measuring 6.8 x 22 
6.8 cm. A white arrow measuring 1.8 x 9.4 cm was used as an attentional cue. To minimize 23 
participants’ eye movements, the arrow cue was presented in the center of the monitor. The 24 
distance between the monitor and participants was 50 cm. 25 
 26 
3.3 Procedure 27 
Before the experiment described below, each participant completed a practice session, 28 
which included four study trials and eight test trials. During the study session, participants 29 
were instructed to memorize 160 stimuli presented on the computer monitor. Each stimulus 30 
was presented for 1000 ms with an inter-trial interval of 1500 ms, during which a central 31 
fixation cue was presented (Figure 1). After the study session, participants conducted an 32 
arithmetic task for 2 minutes.  33 
 34 
During the test session, 160 new stimuli and 160 old stimuli were presented in random 35 
order. Participants judged whether each stimulus was old or new and reported their awareness 36 
of memory according to the Remember/Know procedure (Gardiner, 1988). “Remember” 37 





specific details of the stimulus or through contextual information from the study session. 1 
“Know” responses indicated that the recognition was supported by a vague feeling of 2 
familiarity without conscious recollection of stimulus details or contextual information. 3 
Before the experiment, participants were instructed that half of the stimuli in the test session 4 
were new and that the other half were old. This instruction was given to prevent participants 5 
from being too conservative in judging whether the stimuli were old or new. 6 
 7 
During each test trial, after the presentation of the fixation cross for 1500 ms, an 8 
arrow was presented for 500 ms as an attentional cue, followed by the stimulus (Figure 1). In 9 
the preliminary study, participants were explicitly instructed to attend to the direction of the 10 
attentional cue. The stimulus continued to be presented until participants responded. The 11 
stimulus was presented either to the left or the right of the monitor, and its center was 8.2 cm 12 
away from the center of the monitor. If participants provided an “old” response, an alternative 13 
(R or K) was presented and participants made a resultant metamemory judgment. The arrow 14 
was equally likely to appear toward the left or the right and was non-predictive as to either 15 
the location or the study status (old/new) of the stimulus. Participants experienced a total of 16 
320 trials (80 congruent/new, 80 congruent/old, 80 incongruent/new, and 80 incongruent/old 17 
trials) in random order.  18 
 19 
After the experiment, participants completed a questionnaire in which they were asked 20 
whether they assumed any relationships to exist between the attentional condition 21 
(congruent/incongruent) and the study status of the stimulus (old/new).  22 
 23 
4. Data Analysis 24 
Recollection and familiarity are considered independent or redundant, not mutually 25 
exclusive (see Yonelinas, 2002 for a review). However, in the Remember/Know procedure, 26 
participants make know responses when a stimulus is familiar and not recollected. Therefore, 27 
the raw proportion of know responses underestimates the actual familiarity (Yonelinas & 28 
Jacoby, 1995). To overcome the problem, recollection and familiarity were estimated under 29 
the independent Remember/Know assumption (IRK) (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995). Under this 30 
assumption, familiarity is calculated by dividing the proportion of know responses by 1 31 
minus the proportion of remember responses [IRK familiarity = pKnow/(1-pRemember)]. 32 
These estimates were calculated separately for each condition. Under the IRK assumption, 33 
the estimate of recollection and familiarity can have a mutually independent value. Thanks to 34 
this, we calculated recognition accuracy (Pr) and recognition bias (Br) (Snodgrass & Corwin, 35 
1988) separately for recollection and familiarity. Pr is defined as the proportion of hits minus 36 
the proportion of false alarms [Pr = pHit-pFA] and sometimes called the “corrected 37 





[Br = pFA/(1-Pr)]. Furthermore, under the IRK assumption, metamemory (recollection/IRK 1 
familiarity) can be used as a factor in ANOVA analysis because independence is assured 2 
between factor levels (see Scariano & Davenport, 1987 with regards to the assumption of 3 
independence in ANOVA analysis). Repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted separately 4 
on the false recognition of new stimuli (false alarm), correct recognition of old stimuli (hit), 5 
recognition accuracy (Pr), and recognition bias (Br). Partial η2 was reported to represent 6 
effect size. According to Cohen’s criteria, partial η2 of 0.01 is small, 0.06 is moderate, and 7 
0.14 is large (Cohen, 1992). (Please see Richardson (2011) as to the applicability of Cohen’s 8 
criteria to partial η2.) 9 
 10 
5. Results and Discussion 11 
The post-experiment questionnaire showed that no participants assumed the existence 12 
of any relationships between the attentional condition and the study status of the stimulus. 13 
Recognition memory performances and reaction times for old/new judgments in each 14 
condition are summarized in Table 1. We conducted an ANOVA on the false recognition of 15 
new stimuli with metamemory (recollection/IRK familiarity) and attentional condition 16 
(congruent/incongruent) as within-participant factors. There was a significant main effect for 17 
metamemory (F (1, 19) = 51.90, p < .001, partial η2 = .732) but no significant main effect for 18 
the attentional condition (F (1, 19) = 0.22, p = .645, partial η2 = .011). An interaction was 19 
nonsignificant (F (1, 19) = 0.03, p = .865, partial η2 = .002). These results suggest that 20 
attentional cueing did not affect the false recognition of new stimuli. The RT in old/new 21 
judgments for new stimuli was significantly faster in the congruent condition than in the 22 
incongruent condition (t (19) = 3.95, p < .001, d′ = 0.87). 23 
 24 
Next, we conducted an ANOVA on the correct recognition of old stimuli with 25 
metamemory and attentional condition as within-participant factors. There was no significant 26 
main effect for metamemory (F (1, 19) = 0.34, p = .568, partial η2 = .017) but a significant 27 
main effect for the attentional condition (F (1, 19) = 6.28, p = .021, partial η2 = .248) was 28 
observed. An interaction was nonsignificant (F (1, 19) = 0.25, p = .620, partial η2 = .013). 29 
The results indicate that the correct recognition of old stimuli was more frequent in the 30 
incongruent condition than in the congruent condition. The RT in old/new judgments for old 31 
stimuli was significantly faster in the congruent condition than in the incongruent condition (t 32 
(19) = 5.02, p < .001, d′ = 1.12). 33 
 34 
We also analyzed recognition accuracy (Pr). An ANOVA showed a significant main 35 
effect for metamemory (F (1, 19) = 7.61, p = .013, partial η2 = .286) and the attentional 36 
condition (F (1, 19) = 4.58, p = .045, partial η2 = .194). An interaction was nonsignificant (F 37 





was higher in the incongruent condition than in the congruent condition. 1 
 2 
Finally, we conducted an ANOVA on recognition bias (Br) with metamemory and 3 
attentional condition as within-participant factors. A significant main effect for metamemory 4 
was found (F (1, 19) = 20.64, p < .001, partial η2 = .521), but no significant main effect was 5 
found for the attentional condition (F (1, 19) = 0.571, p = .459, partial η2 = .029). An 6 
interaction was nonsignificant (F (1, 19) = 0.14, p = .711, partial η2 = .007). These results 7 
suggest that attentional cueing did not affect participants’ recognition bias. 8 
 9 
Notably, however, additional analyses without the IRK assumption showed a different 10 
pattern of results than that described above (see the appendix for details).i Simply stated, 11 
attentional cueing did not have significant effects on participants’ raw responses but did have 12 
effects on recognition measures estimated from those responses under the IRK assumption. 13 
The present findings must be interpreted carefully. In any case, contrary to our expectation, 14 
attentional cueing did not affect participants’ recognition bias. Although it is unclear why this 15 
pattern of results arose, one possibility is that the participants might try to remain unaffected 16 
by attentional manipulation in recognition judgments when they consciously shift their 17 
attention on their own. To explore this possibility, we conducted the main experiment, in 18 
which participants were not explicitly instructed to attend to the direction of the arrow. As 19 
several significant effects of attentional cueing were observed in the preliminary study, we 20 
used the same task settings (e.g., number of participants, set size of stimuli, duration of 21 
attentional cue) in the main experiment. 22 
 23 
6. Main Experiment 24 
6.1 Methods 25 
6.1.1 Stimuli and procedure 26 
The stimuli and procedure were the same as that of the preliminary experiment, 27 
except that no instruction was given regarding the attentional cue; participants were not 28 
explicitly instructed to attend to the direction of the cue. Nevertheless, the arrow cue was 29 
shown to automatically change the attentional states of participants (e.g., Bayliss et al., 2006; 30 
Tipples, 2002). 31 
 32 
6.2 Participants 33 
In all, 22 students from Kyoto University aged between 19 and 24 years (M = 21.2, 34 
SD = 1.47) participated in the experiment and were paid according to the Kyoto University 35 
standard. Fifteen participants were male and 7 were female. All participants had normal color 36 
vision. Informed written consent was obtained from participants before the experiment. All 37 







6.3 Results 3 
The post-experiment questionnaire showed that no participants assumed the 4 
existence of any relationships between the attentional condition and the study status of the 5 
stimulus. Recognition memory performances and reaction times for old/new judgments in 6 
each condition are summarized in Table 2. Recollection and familiarity were estimated under 7 
the IRK assumption.  8 
 9 
First, we conducted an ANOVA on the false recognition of new stimuli with 10 
metamemory (recollection/IRK familiarity) and attentional condition (congruent/incongruent) 11 
as within-participant factors (Figure 2A). A significant main effect was found for 12 
metamemory (F (1, 21) = 82.78, p < .001, partial η2 = .798), but no significant main effect 13 
was found for the attentional condition (F (1, 21) = 3.25, p = .086, partial η2 = .134). An 14 
interaction between these two factors was significant (F (1, 21) = 4.44, p = .047, partial η2 15 
= .175). A simple main effect analysis revealed that the estimate of IRK familiarity was 16 
significantly higher in the incongruent condition than in the congruent condition (F (1, 42) = 17 
7.38, p = .0096, partial η2 = .260), which suggests that participants exhibited 18 
familiarity-based false recognition more frequently in the incongruent condition. A post hoc 19 
power analysis revealed that the power to detect this simple main effect was 0.98 under the 20 
current settings (sample size = 22 and significance level = 0.05). No significant difference 21 
between the estimate of recollection in the congruent condition and in the incongruent 22 
condition was seen (F (1, 42) = 0.02, p = .896, partial η2 = .001). In addition, the RT in 23 
old/new judgments for new stimuli was significantly faster in the congruent condition than in 24 
the incongruent condition (t (21) = 3.45, p = .002, d′ = 0.74). 25 
 26 
Second, we conducted an ANOVA on the correct recognition of old stimuli with 27 
metamemory and attentional condition as within-participant factors (Figure 2B). No 28 
significant main effect was found for metamemory (F (1, 21) = 0.002, p = .965, partial η2 29 
= .0001), nor was a significant main effect found for the attentional condition (F (1, 21) = 30 
1.23, p = .281, partial η2 = .055). An interaction between metamemory and the attentional 31 
condition was also nonsignificant (F (1, 21) = 1.41, p = .249, partial η2 = .063). These results 32 
suggest that attentional cueing did not affect the correct recognition of old stimuli. The RT in 33 
old/new judgments for old stimuli was significantly faster in the congruent condition than in 34 
the incongruent condition (t (21) = 2.94, p = .008, d′ = 0.63). 35 
 36 
Third, we analyzed recognition accuracy (Pr) under the IRK assumption (Table 2). 37 





within-participant factors. A significant main effect for metamemory was found (F (1, 21) = 1 
6.78, p = .017, partial η2 = .244), but no significant main effect was found for the attentional 2 
condition (F (1, 21) = 0.21, p = .651, partial η2 = .010). Furthermore, no significant 3 
interaction between metamemory and the attentional condition was seen (F (1, 21) = 0.02, p 4 
= .893, partial η2 = .001). The results suggest no significant effect of attentional cueing on 5 
recognition accuracy. 6 
 7 
Finally, we analyzed recognition bias (Br) under the IRK assumption (Table 2). We 8 
conducted an ANOVA on Br with metamemory and attentional condition as 9 
within-participant factors. A significant main effect for metamemory was found (F (1, 21) = 10 
77.70, p < .001, partial η2 = .787), but no significant main effect was found for the attentional 11 
condition (F (1, 21) = 2.79, p = .110, partial η2 = .117). The interaction between metamemory 12 
and attentional condition approached significance (F (1, 21) = 3.33, p = .082, partial η2 13 
= .137). A simple main effect analysis revealed that familiarity-based Br was higher in the 14 
incongruent condition (F (1, 42) = 5.63, p = .022, partial η2 = .211), suggesting that 15 
familiarity-based recognition was more liberal in the incongruent condition. A post hoc 16 
power analysis revealed that the power to detect this simple main effect was 0.95. Attentional 17 
condition did not significantly affect recollection-based Br (F (1, 42) = 0.24, p = .624, partial 18 
η2 = .011). 19 
 20 
In summary, the present results reveal that familiarity-based false recognition 21 
increased by incongruent cueing in testing. This increased false recognition was associated 22 
with participants’ liberal recognition bias, not with decreased recognition accuracy. Thus, 23 
increased familiarity-based false recognition in the incongruent condition cannot be attributed 24 
to the possibility that participants could not accurately recognize the stimulus due to 25 
inattention. Note that additional analyses without the IRK assumption showed a consistent 26 
pattern of results with the above-mentioned main results (see the appendix for details).ii 27 
 28 
7. General Discussion 29 
The main experiment provides the novel finding that stimulus-irrelevant attentional 30 
cues bias recognition memory judgments and induce familiarity-based false recognition. 31 
Although we did not explicitly instruct participants to attend to the direction of the arrow cue, 32 
it automatically affected the fluency of stimulus processing (reflected in significant RT 33 
difference). In the incongruent condition, participants may attribute part of the perceived 34 
disfluency to the attentional cue and overestimate the fluency of the stimulus, thus leading to 35 
more liberal familiarity-based recognition judgments. On the other hand, in the congruent 36 
condition, participants may attribute some parts of the perceived fluency to the attentional cue 37 





stimulus and exhibit more conservative familiarity-based recognition judgments. Unlike the 1 
prime used in previous studies, the attentional cue in the present study was not perceptually 2 
or semantically related to the stimulus. Nevertheless, participants may still attribute the 3 
perceived fluency or disfluency to the cue. We did not provide any instruction about the 4 
attentional cue to participants. Moreover, participants reported in the questionnaire that they 5 
did not assume any relationships to exist between the attentional condition 6 
(congruent/incongruent) and the study status of the stimulus (old/new). Therefore, attentional 7 
cueing might induce unintentional processing about the source of fluency, consequently 8 
causing bias in participants’ recognition memory. This explanation accords with the fluency 9 
discounting account introduced by Jacoby and Whitehouse (1989) but is inconsistent with the 10 
fluency/disfluency account proposed by Huber et al. (2008). If stimulus fluency itself is 11 
critical for memory bias, recognition judgments would have been more liberal in the 12 
congruent condition; however, the opposite occurred in this study. 13 
 14 
The present findings may also be explained in the context of the 15 
discrepancy-attribution theory (e.g., Whittlesea & Williams, 1998, 2000, 2001). This theory 16 
assumes that a feeling of familiarity arises when actual fluency is discrepant from expected 17 
fluency (e.g., seeing one’s spouse in the subway rather than in the kitchen). In the present 18 
study, expected fluency may be lower in the incongruent condition than in the congruent 19 
condition. Unexpectedly high fluency in the incongruent condition may lead to a strong 20 
feeling of familiarity, leading to participants exhibiting more old responses. Another possible 21 
speculation stems from the effect of selective attention. Fischer and Whitney (2009) reported 22 
that spatially directed attention narrows the tuning of population-coded position 23 
representations in the primary visual cortex. The narrowed representation of the stimulus may 24 
inhibit the diffusional activation of delusive information and may reduce familiarity-based 25 
false recognition in the congruent condition. However, this account cannot explain why 26 
attentional cueing induces an overall shift of recognition bias in familiarity-based recognition 27 
judgments. 28 
 29 
Attentional cueing only affected the estimate of familiarity; the estimate of 30 
recollection was not affected. As we mentioned in the introduction, the pattern of the results 31 
is compatible with two influential models of dual-process recognition memory. In the DPSD 32 
model (Yonelinas, 1994), recollection is thought to depend on an all-or-none threshold 33 
process, whereas familiarity is a continuous variable that can be influenced by fluency 34 
manipulation. In the CDP model (Wixted & Mickes, 2010), recollection and familiarity are 35 
considered to depend on two respective signal distributions. If we assume that attentional 36 
cueing affects familiarity distribution with recollection distribution relatively unaffected, this 37 





as a graded phenomenon under the CDP model, there is room for recollection to be affected 1 
by fluency manipulation. Consistent with this, Lucas et al. (2012) reported that masked 2 
priming affected both remember and know responses. Furthermore, Kurilla and Westerman 3 
(2008) reported that masked priming affected individual ratings of recollection and 4 
familiarity. However, these empirical findings do not instantly allow for rejection of the 5 
DPSD model (Yonelinas, 1994), because Remember/Know responses and individual ratings 6 
may not be process-pure measures of recollection and familiarity; these putative measures of 7 
recollection could partially reflect familiarity and thus be affected by fluency manipulation. 8 
 9 
Furthermore, attentional cueing only affected the false familiarity for new stimuli; 10 
the correct familiarity for old stimuli was not affected. In accordance with this evidence, 11 
several studies demonstrated that the fluency effect on recognition judgments was more 12 
robust for new rather than old stimuli (e.g., Tunney & Fernie, 2007; Westerman, 2008; 13 
Whittlesea & Williams, 2001). One possibility is that the estimate of familiarity for old 14 
stimuli may be to some extent contaminated with recollection from the study session, and 15 
thus less affected by attentional cueing. Several studies support the idea that know responses 16 
entail some amount of recollection (Hicks, Marsh, & Ritschel, 2002; Johnson et al., 2009; 17 
Wais, Mickes, & Wixted, 2008). However, the pattern of results is not consistent among the 18 
literature reporting that fluency manipulation affects responses for both old and new stimuli 19 
(e.g., Dew & Cabeza, 2013; Rajaram & Geraci, 2000). 20 
 21 
The present study shows that stimulus-irrelevant attentional cueing biases 22 
recognition memory. This has significant implications for everyday situations, in that the 23 
incidental manipulation of attention could occur in many situations in our daily lives. Imagine 24 
that something distracts your attention from a to-be-perceived situation. In this case, you may 25 
unintentionally overestimate the perceived fluency for the situation and falsely recognize it as 26 
one you have experienced before. Déjà vu may be one manifestation of this bias. Moreover, 27 
this kind of memory bias is of serious concern in some cases, such as eyewitness testimony. 28 
To explore the generality and applicability of the effect reported here, additional studies using 29 
variable materials would be helpful. In particular, the stimuli of social importance, such as 30 
human faces or lexical words, may be suitable for further investigation. 31 
 32 
Lastly, it is important to note several limitations in the present study. One issue 33 
regards the difference in results between the preliminary and main experiments. The 34 
preliminary results showed that the attentional cue did not change participants’ recognition 35 
bias when participants explicitly shifted their attention. One could speculate that 36 
unintentional processing about the source of fluency might not occur when attention is 37 





attentional manipulation when they consciously shift their attention on their own, and 1 
intentional memory processing dominates over unintentional processing about the source of 2 
fluency. Consistent with these speculations, participants exhibited slower RTs in the 3 
preliminary experiment than in the main experiment (though this is a between-participant 4 
comparison), suggesting that they depended more heavily on intentional memory processing. 5 
Future research is needed to explore the factors that modulate the effect of attentional cueing 6 
on recognition judgments. Another issue is that there were no control conditions and thus we 7 
could only conduct relative comparisons between the congruent and incongruent conditions. 8 
Establishing an appropriate control condition enables us to separately assess the effect of 9 
congruent and incongruent cues. Finally, it should be noted that the mechanism for 10 
attentional cueing to affect processing fluency may differ in quality from that for other 11 
experimental manipulations (e.g., repetition priming, conceptual priming, changes in 12 
perceptual clarity). Differences and similarities of the effect of these quantitatively different 13 
experimental manipulations on recognition judgments remain open for further investigation. 14 
 15 
8. Conclusion 16 
Attentional cueing biases familiarity-based recognition judgments. This effect is well 17 
explained by the hypothesis regarding unintentional processing about the source of fluency. 18 
As attentional cueing is a simple yet powerful method for manipulating fluency, it would be 19 
of great service for future research to further elucidate the contribution that processing 20 
fluency makes to memory processes. 21 
 22 
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Table 1 2 
Mean recognition performances and mean reaction time in the preliminary experiment. 3 
  Congruent         Incongruent       
  Old stimuli New stimuli Pr Br   Old stimuli New stimuli Pr Br 
Recollection 0.53 (0.18) 0.03 (0.04) 0.50 (0.20) 0.06 (0.07) 
 
0.55 (0.19) 0.02 (0.03) 0.53 (0.20) 0.07 (0.15) 
pKnow 0.24 (0.12) 0.12 (0.07) 
   
0.23 (0.10) 0.12 (0.07) 
  
IRK Familiarity 0.49 (0.12) 0.13 (0.08) 0.36 (0.16) 0.20 (0.10) 
 
0.53 (0.12) 0.13 (0.08) 0.40 (0.15) 0.20 (0.10) 
RT (ms) 1325 (258) 1367 (225)       1429 (278) 1505 (277)     


































Table 2 2 
Mean recognition performances and mean reaction time in the main experiment. 3 
  Congruent         Incongruent       
  Old stimuli New stimuli Pr Br   Old stimuli New stimuli Pr Br 
Recollection 0.50 (0.17) 0.03 (0.04) 0.47 (0.18) 0.05 (0.06) 
 
0.51 (0.20) 0.03 (0.03) 0.49 (0.21) 0.06 (0.06) 
pKnow 0.25 (0.13) 0.14 (0.07) 
   
0.26 (0.13) 0.16 (0.07) 
  
IRK Familiarity 0.49 (0.17) 0.15 (0.07) 0.35 (0.15) 0.23 (0.12) 
 
0.53 (0.19) 0.17 (0.07) 0.36 (0.19) 0.28 (0.13) 
RT (ms) 1231 (249) 1268 (235)       1281 (267) 1335 (278)     





















































































Figure 2 11 
Figure 2 (A) Estimates of false recollection and false IRK familiarity. (B) Estimates of 12 
correct recollection and correct IRK familiarity. Error bars indicate the standard error of the 13 






























                                                   
i Additional analyses for the preliminary experiment 
Additional analyses were conducted using the raw proportion of remember and know responses 
without the IRK procedure (Table 1). An ANOVA on the proportion of responses for new stimuli was 
conducted with metamemory response (remember/know) and attentional condition 
(congruent/incongruent) as within-participant factors. A significant main effect was found for metamemory 
response (F (1, 19) = 51.31, p < .001, partial η2 = .730), but no significant main effect was found for 
attentional condition (F (1, 19) = 0.14, p = .071, partial η2 = .007). An interaction between these two 
factors was not significant (F (1, 19) = 0.002, p = .963, partial η2 = .0001).  
Next, we conducted an ANOVA on the proportion of responses for old stimuli. A significant main 
effect was found for metamemory response (F (1, 19) = 22.91, p < .001, partial η2 = .547) and a main 
effect for attentional condition was approaching significance (F (1, 19) = 3.39, p = .081, partial η2 = .152). 
An interaction between these two factors was nonsignificant (F (1, 19) = 1.60, p = .222, partial η2 = .078).  
Further, we analyzed signal detection measures (d′ and C) for old/new responses pooled across 
metamemory responses. Response accuracy (d′) in the congruent condition (M = 1.90, SD = 0.68) was not 
significantly different from that in the incongruent condition (M = 2.02, SD = 0.77) (t (19) = 1.30, p = .211, 
d′ = 0.29). Moreover, response bias (C) in the congruent condition (M = 0.17, SD = 0.23) was not 
significantly different from that in the incongruent condition (M = 0.13, SD = 0.25) (t (19) = 1.40, p =.176, 
d′ = 0.31). 
In short, these additional analyses showed that attentional cueing did not have significant effects 
on participants’ raw responses without the IRK procedure. 
 
 
ii Additional analyses for the main experiment 
To follow up the main results, additional analyses were conducted using the raw proportion of 
remember and know responses without the IRK procedure (Table 2). An ANOVA on the proportion of  
responses for new stimuli was conducted with metamemory response (remember/know) and attentional 
condition (congruent/incongruent) as within-participant factors. A significant main effect was found for 
metamemory response (F (1, 21) = 75.63, p < .001, partial η2 = .783), but no significant main effect was 
found for attentional condition (F (1, 21) = 3.48, p = .076, partial η2 = .142). An interaction between these 
two factors was nearly significant (F (1, 21) = 4.44, p = .054, partial η2 = .166). A simple main effect 
analysis revealed that the proportion of know responses was significantly higher in the incongruent 
condition than in the congruent condition (F (1, 42) = 7.50, p = .009, partial η2 = .263). No significant 
difference between the proportion of remember responses in the congruent condition and that in the 
incongruent condition was seen (F (1, 42) = 0.02, p = .892, partial η2 = .001). 
Next, we conducted an ANOVA on the proportion of responses for old stimuli. A significant main 
effect was found for metamemory response (F (1, 21) = 16.29, p = .001, partial η2 = .437). There was no 
significant main effect for attentional condition (F (1, 21) = 0.80, p = .382, partial η2 = .037). An 
interaction between these two factors was nonsignificant (F (1, 21) = 0.01, p = .906, partial η2 = .001). 
To further support the main findings, we analyzed signal detection measures (d′ and C) for 
old/new responses pooled across metamemory responses. Response accuracy (d′) in the congruent 
condition (M = 1.75, SD = 0.53) was not significantly different from that in the incongruent condition (M = 
1.73, SD = 0.69) (t (21) = 0.28, p = .782, d′ = 0.06). However, response bias (C) in the congruent condition 
(M = 0.16, SD = 0.25) was marginally significantly higher than that in the incongruent condition (M = 0.06, 
SD = 0.26) (t (21) = 1.93, p =.067, d′ = 0.41). 
In sum, these additional results are consistent with the main results under the IRK assumption. 
 
† 
As the above-described ANOVAs include the mutually exclusive metamemory response (remember/know) 
as a factor, the assumption of independence is violated, which can lead to biased Type I and Type II error 
rates (see Scariano & Davenport, 1987). 
 
